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The asymmetrical force of
persuasive knowledge across
the positive–negative divide
Mads Nordmo* and Marcus Selart*
Department of Strategy and Management, The Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway
In two experimental studies we explore to what extent the general effects of positive and
negative framing also apply to positive and negative persuasion. Our results reveal that
negative persuasion induces substantially higher levels of skepticism and awareness of
being subjected to a persuasion attempt. Furthermore, we demonstrate that in positive
persuasion, more claims lead to stronger persuasion, while in negative persuasion, the
numerosity of claims carries no significant effect. We interpret this finding along the
lines of a satiety-model of persuasion. Finally, using diluted, or low strength claims in a
persuasion attempt, we reveal a significant interaction between dispositional reactance
and dilution of claims on persuasion knowledge. The interaction states that diluted
claims increase the awareness of being subjected to a persuasion attempt, but only
for those with a high dispositional level of reactance.
Keywords: persuasion, resistance, CSR, negativity bias, persuasion knowledge, attribute framing, numerosity,
dilution effect
Introduction
The purpose of this research is threefold: Firstly, it demonstrates that resistance and skepticism to
persuasion is not symmetrical across the positive–negative divide. Secondly, it demonstrates that
the number of claims have diﬀerent eﬀects in positive and negative persuasion. Thirdly, it brings
about important managerial implications for corporate social responsibility (CSR) communication
in particular, and persuasion in general. The main research-question addressed by this paper is:
What are the eﬀects of diﬀerent numbers of claims in positive and negative persuasion? The second,
related research-question is: how do diﬀerent qualities of claims aﬀect the outcomes in positive and
negative persuasion? These questions are explored in two experiments, using CSR communications
as stimuli.
In CSR research in particular, and in psychology in general, there is a heightened need to
better understand the evaluative artifacts of positive and negative persuasion. Corporations today
are commonly considered to have social responsibility to serve the people, communities, society,
and the environment in ways that go above and beyond what is legally required (Wood, 1991;
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001; Lockett et al., 2006). As a consequence, corporations now face the
opportunity to communicate all their socially and environmentally laudable eﬀorts in order to
increase their likeability. However, they also face the risk of negative attention reaching their less
prize-worthy activities. Individuals and organizations thus face a perilous and delicate situation.
By under-communicating CSR activities, one faces the risk of people never learning about the
activities, and possibly assuming that no CSR initiatives have been made. By over-communicating
CSR activities, one faces the risk of skepticism and cynicism on behalf of weary consumers, who
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disbelieve the accuracy and sincerity of the claims. There is a
far-reaching string of literature regarding how the number of
claims, or arguments, aﬀect the outcome of persuasion. The
idea that additional positive information increases liking has
been largely supported in psychological research on attribution
and impression formation. Stewart (1965) found that the when
participants are presented with a description of a person
consisting of one, two, three or four positive traits, and
subsequently four negative traits, the liking of the person
increased monotonically with each positive trait. This ﬁnding
and others led to the conclusion that the impression of a
person becomes more favorable with each new positive trait.
Anderson (1967) referred to this eﬀect as the “set-size eﬀect.”
Broadening the scope from impression formation to general
persuasion, further research on the eﬀect of amount of persuasive
information has generally conﬁrmed the ﬁnding made by Stewart
(1965) and Anderson (1967). Pelham et al. (1994) refer to
the broad positive correlation between amount of persuasive
information and persuasion as the numerosity eﬀect. The
numerosity eﬀect states that as a default, the more persuasive
information a message contains, up to some reasonable limit,
the more persuaded people tend to be (see Calder et al.,
1974; Norman, 1976; Calder, 1978; Chaiken, 1980; Maddux and
Rogers, 1980). Thus, the numerosity eﬀect, whereby presenting
more persuasive information leads to more persuasion is quite
pervasive (see also Tormala and Petty, 2007). We refer to the
inﬂection-point, after which more information of the same
valence no longer causes changes in attitude, as the point of
“satiety.” A key question in the research on the optimal number
of claims in persuasion is how many claims are needed before
informational satiety is achieved.
Recently, the numerosity eﬀect has been related to the
elaboration likelihood model (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986a,b)
such that participants’ judgments based on the number of
considered arguments are observed to diﬀer between high and
low elaboration conditions (Tormala et al., 2002). The point
of “satiety” might thus diﬀer depending on the cognitive load
connected to the attribute information. Elaboration might also
impact on the point of “satiety” in that attribute numerosity has
been observed to beneﬁt hedonic more than utilitarian options
(Sela and Berger, 2012).
An important caveat to the set-size eﬀect or numerosity eﬀect
lies in the diﬀerence between communication with perceived
informational intention, and communication with perceived
persuasive intention. There is a crucial diﬀerence between
the research demonstrating the set size-eﬀect, and marketing
studies. In the impression formation literature, the source of
the communication, typically referred to as “agent,” has no
persuasive intention, only informational intent. The degree to
which a target is aware of the agents persuasive intention is
referred to as the targets persuasion knowledge (Friestad and
Wright, 1994). As consumers have gotten more accustomed to
marketers persuasion-intention, they have developed a slightly
diﬀerent way of dealing with information with persuasive intent
(Campbell and Kirmani, 2008). Speciﬁcally, when dealing with
information from a source that has a perceived persuasive intent,
subjects will engage in coping-cognitions, in an attempt to
maintain a sense of independent and dissuaded view of the
product, service or person they are evaluating. The persuasion
knowledge model (Friestad and Wright, 1994) is important in
this respect, as it changes the focus from message design to
message receiver. In doing so, it conveys the notion that the
perception of the message is more important than its objective
design. The model states that all targets will attempt to hold
valid product-, or service-attitudes when faced with a persuasion
attempt. In order to maintain a valid attitude toward the product,
the target will analyze the persuasion tactics, the eﬀectiveness
and the appropriateness of the persuasive agent, and adjust their
impression accordingly. Put in terms of CSR marketing, this
entails that the perceived social responsibility is more important
than the actual or objective social responsibility. Eﬀective CSR
communication can be achieved only when the coping eﬀorts
of the target is taken into account. It is also important to
note that individual diﬀerences in skepticism and reactance are
likely to induce diﬀerent levels and styles of coping-cognitions
(Clee and Wicklund, 1980; Hong and Page, 1989; Campbell and
Kirmani, 2000). Friestad andWright (1994) call for more research
exploring these persuasion dynamics: “An important part of
a complete theory of persuasion is, therefore, an explanation
of [. . .] aspects of an agents overall behavior that disguise
a tactic or that makes its execution seem heavy-handed or
transparent to targets.” There are many identiﬁed factors in the
execution of a persuasion attempt that may make the eﬀort
seem heavy-handed or transparent, and thus elicit and increase
persuasion knowledge and coping. For instance, prevention-
focus or regulation focus in the framing of the message (Kirmani
and Zhu, 2007), forced exposure (Edwards et al., 2002), attention-
getting tactics (Campbell, 1995), advertising repetition (Kirmani,
1997), and others, have all been identiﬁed as factors that increase
persuasion knowledge in targets. Increasing the number of claims
in a persuasion attempt is another factor that may induce
increased persuasion knowledge, as the persuasion-attempt is
perceived as more transparent or heavy-handed if the number
of claims is perceived as too high (Campbell and Kirmani,
2000; DeCarlo, 2005). It is not all together clear how many
claims are optimal for persuasion. Recent research on the
optimal number of claims in motivated persuasion has shown
that the persuasive eﬀect increases only up to three claims
(Shu and Carlson, 2014). Including a fourth claim was shown
to increase skepticism and persuasion knowledge rather than
persuasion, when consumers know that the message source has
a persuasion motive. Through several experiments, Shu and
Carlson (2014) demonstrate that three claims produced a more
favorable evaluation than two or four claims. They also suggest
that coping is the cause of the fall in persuasiveness when a
fourth claim is presented, by demonstrating that respondents
under high cognitive strain show increased persuasion when
being presented with a fourth claim, whereas the non-strained
control-group show most favorable evaluation after only three
claims. By depleting cognitive resources from the research-
subjects, the ability to cope with the persuasive content was
reduced.
Part of the reason why over-communication sometimes
hampers persuasion may be that when more claims are added,
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some of the claims are perceived as weaker, or less relevant
than the others. Including weak or irrelevant information
has been proven to reduce the persuasiveness of a message.
Nisbett et al. (1981) refer to this phenomenon as dilution-eﬀect.
Dilution-eﬀect is deﬁned as: “A judgment bias in which the
presence of non-diagnostic cues, when processed along with
diagnostic cues, causes a judge to under-weigh the diagnostic
cues” (Waller and Zimbelman, 2003, p. 254). Dilution eﬀects have
been documented across many disciplines and research-settings
(see Ettenson et al., 1987; Tetlock and Boettger, 1989; Smith
et al., 1998; Meyvis and Janiszewski, 2002). Field experiments
in economics have documented similar phenomena, referred to
as “less is better” or “more is less” eﬀects (Hsee, 1998; List,
2002). In these experiments, bundles of high-quality objects
elicit higher willingness to pay than the same bundles, with the
addition of some lower quality objects. The use of relatively
low quality/low importance claims in conjunction with high
quality claims thus appears to be one factor that makes persuasive
intent seem more heavy-handed and transparent, which in
turn may increase coping, and thus reduce persuasive eﬀect.
De Vries et al. (2014) conducted three experiments to explore
the role of dilution-eﬀects in communication for and against
carbon dioxide capture and storage. They used combinations
of highly relevant, moderately relevant and irrelevant claims.
Dilution eﬀects were only manifest in positive persuasion, and
only when combining highly relevant and irrelevant information.
However, interesting, these experiments did not includemeasures
of persuasion knowledge. Experiment 2 in the present research
thus represents a partial replication and attempted exploration of
the mechanisms behind the ﬁndings presented in De Vries et al.
(2014).
Summarized, the literature on the number of claims in
persuasion suggests four main ﬁndings: (a) Increasing the
number of claims leads to incremental increase in persuasion, up
to a point of satiety. (b) The point of satiety, after which further
claims no longer increases persuasion, is reached earlier when the
target perceives the agent as having persuasive intent, and later
when elaboration and scrutiny is low. (c) Increasing the number
of claims can increase the likelihood that the agent is perceived
as having persuasive intent. (d) Adding weak claims to bundles
of strong claims can dilute the overall persuasiveness of the
communication. An important gap in this research is that almost
all these ﬁndings stem from experiments in positive persuasion,
i.e., persuading others to believe that something or someone
is good. Whether the same eﬀects would emerge in negative
persuasion, i.e., persuading others to believe that something or
someone is bad, is largely unknown. This gap is not only of
theoretical relevance to psychology. As CSR is becoming an
increasingly important part of brand strategy, it is of tantamount
importance to understand how consumers perceive diﬀerent
CSR-strategies, how they cope with the persuasive intent of
CSR communication, and what evaluative artifacts these coping
processes produce (Olsen et al., 2014).
Considering the body of research on good vs. bad perception
and judgments (see Baumeister et al., 2001; Rozin and Royzman,
2001), there is good reason to suspect that the dynamics of
evaluating negative claims are qualitatively diﬀerent from those
of positive claims. For instance, individuals who spend less time
and require less information in order to classify an event, person,
or object as bad may have an adaptive advantage. Thus, the
consequences of type 2 errors (failing to detect a pattern) in
this domain are often more severe than the consequence of
type 1 errors (perceiving a pattern where there is none). In
literature-studies, the “tragic ﬂaw”, or Hamartia, has been a
familiar concept since the Greek dramas. A tragic ﬂaw typically
consists of a single failing or transgression that brings about
ruin to the otherwise admirable character (Sherman, 1992). Social
anthropologist studying purity and contamination in Hindu
cultures have noted a negativity bias in that purity is diﬃcult
to reach and maintain, while a single act of contagion (like
touching a person of lower caste) will instantly contaminate the
entire person (Rozin and Royzman, 2001). In social and moral
psychology, the negativity eﬀect states that evaluative negative
information is weighted more heavily than evaluative positive
information in overall evaluations (Kanouse and Hanson, 1971).
This eﬀect, sometimes referred to as the positive–negative
asymmetry or negativity bias, is considered especially relevant
when evaluations entail aﬀective reactions (Lewicka et al., 1992).
In judgment and decision-making research, the prospect theory
demonstrates that people are more aversive toward small losses
than they are positive toward corresponding gains (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). This eﬀect implies that people tend to be
risk-averse over prospects involving gains, while they are risk-
seeking when it comes to prospects involving losses (Shefrin
and Statman, 1985; Frazzini, 2006). Another consequence of the
eﬀect is the tendency of people to sell assets whose price has
increased, while keeping assets that have decreased in value.
The implication is that people are less willing to recognize
losses, but are more willing to recognize gains (Odean, 1998;
Weber and Camerer, 1998; Camerer, 2000; Barberis and Xiong,
2009).
Continuing the general ‘bad is stronger than good’ ﬁnding into
corporate ethics research, Creyer (1997) found that consumers
are willing to purchase from unethical companies, but they expect
a substantial reduction in prices. The consumers expect ethical
corporate behavior as a norm, and are willing to pay a slightly
higher price for products from companies who go above and
beyond the expected level of ethical behavior. The willingness to
pay for products from unethical, normal and ethical companies,
respectively, correspond to the curve of prospect theory, in
which minor ethical violations are weighted more heavily than
corresponding minor ethical advances.
Taken together, the evidence from the ‘bad is stronger than
good’-literature, suggests that the number of claims used in a
persuasion setting should play a larger role in positive persuasion
than negative persuasion. As negative information is processed
more thoroughly, the psychological point of satiety should be
reached sooner in negative persuasion than positive persuasion.
Thus, a positive–negative asymmetry is to be expected, in which
the number of claims cause signiﬁcant changes in the positive
domain, whereas the reaction to negative persuasion should be
less aﬀected by the numerosity of claims. Borrowing the terms
from the Persuasion Knowledge model (Friestad and Wright,
1994), we further theorize that the level persuasion knowledge
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an individual experiences when being persuaded into believing
that something or someone is good, increases as the number
of claims increases. As a contrast, the amount of claims used
in negative persuasion should not elicit changes in persuasion
knowledge, as the point of satiety is reached sooner. There are
several reasons to expect that numerosity of claims will fail to
elicit diﬀerences in persuasion and persuasion knowledge when
subjects are dealing with negative claims. Firstly, high coping
with negative claims may be evolutionarily maladaptive, as the
consequences of adherence and defecting are asymmetrical. As an
example, consider an individual in a pre-historic society, being
subjected to claims favoring the abolishment of certain foods.
Adhering to the advice would take out one of the sources of
food from his diet, which is presumably unfortunate but not
directly life-threatening. Defecting from the advice may result
in much more direct and dire consequences, both in terms of
health and social status. Coping when faced with claims saying
that something or someone is bad, has presumably been less
evolutionarily advantageous than coping when faced with claims
saying that something or someone is good. Secondly, modern
day consumers are presumably more experienced with positive
persuasion, from a lifetime of dealing with marketers (Boush
et al., 1994; John, 1999). Negative persuasion is rarely used
in marketing, with the notable exceptions of health-behavior
ads and political attack ads. Consequently, consumers may
activate their persuasion-knowledge and coping schemas more
eﬀectively and with greater sensitivity when faced with a positive
persuasion attempt, rather than a negative persuasion attempt.
Including diluting (weak) claims into sets of strong claims is
also theorized to produce asymmetrical dilution-eﬀects across
positive and negative persuasion. The subjects being persuaded
into believing that a company is good (environmentally friendly),
are expected to display a higher readiness to perceive the
inclusion of a weak claim as heavy-handed or transparent,
alerting them to the persuasion-attempt they are being subjected
to. The subjects being persuaded to believe that the company is
bad (environmentally aversive), should have a lower readiness
to perceive the inclusion of a weaker claim as heavy-handed
or transparent, and therefore not utilize the same coping
mechanisms.
To summarize, the two related research-questions that stand
to be answered in this thesis are; (1) What are the eﬀects of
diﬀerent numbers of claims in positive and negative persuasion?
and (2) How does diﬀerent qualities of claims eﬀect the outcomes
in positive and negative persuasion? Based on these research-
questions, we state the following four hypotheses:
(1) The number of claims will have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
perception of the company in positive persuasion, but not
in negative persuasion.
(2) The number of claims will have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on persuasion knowledge and skepticism in positive
persuasion, but not in negative persuasion.
(3) Dilution-eﬀects will emerge in positive persuasion, but not
in negative persuasion.
(4) Dilution-eﬀects on persuasion knowledge will be moderated
by dispositional reactance.
Materials and Pre-Testing
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the Research Council of Norway, The
National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences
and the Humanities, with electronically written informed consent
from all subjects. All subjects gave written informed consent in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Before running the
experiment, various claims were tested in a population similar
to the one used in the experiment. We used CSR-related claims
pertaining to an ocean-farming company as setting. There are
two main motivations behind this choice. Firstly, CSR persuasion
has been studied less extensively than traditional persuasion,
even though it is becoming an increasingly important part of
branding (Boulstridge and Carrigan, 2000; Sen and Bhattacharya,
2001; Becker-Olsen et al., 2006; Aburdene, 2007; Costa and
Menichini, 2013). Secondly, ocean-farming has been both hailed
as one of the industries that may potentially be part of the
solution to global warming (Asche and Khatun, 2006), as well as
criticized for being unsustainable in its current form (Folke and
Kautsky, 1992). Our setting thus provides the basis for a plausible
and realistic persuasion-attempt, both in favor and against the
actions of a company. The participants in the pre-test were
exposed to a list of either 10 claims in favor of an ocean-farming
corporations’ social responsibility (positive claims), or 10 claims
in favor of an ocean-farming corporations’ social irresponsibility
(negative claims). Participants were told that all the claims were
candidates to be used in a persuasion setting, but that it was
up to the participant to rate how strong they felt each claim
was. The participants were instructed to allocate 100 points
selectively among the claims. Claims perceived as strong were to
be awarded more points, and claims perceived as weak were to
be awarded few or no points. All 100 points had to be allocated
by each participant. The rank order of the presentation of the
claims were randomized across trials, to ensure that primacy-,
and recency eﬀects did not aﬀect the outcome of the test. A total
of 32 student participants rated the positive claims, and 29
student participants rated the negative claims. The four positive
and four negative claims with the highest score were chosen
to be used in the experiments. Tables 1 and 2 display these
claims (translated to English by the authors), and their mean and
median rating.
Additionally, two positive and one negative claim were
chosen as moderately diluting claims, to be used in the second
experiment. These claims were selected because they fulﬁlled the
criteria of having been evaluated as weak but similar in strength,
across subjects. Table 3 displays the diluting claims used in
Experiment 2.
Procedure and Results
Experiment 1: The Role of Numerosity
The ﬁrst experiment was designed to explore the role of diﬀerent
numbers of claims in positive and negative persuasion. Hundred
and ninety eight students from a large Norwegian business-
school were recruited to the experiment. The participants in the
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TABLE 1 | Evaluation of positive claims.
Claim The
company
has
paid to
restore
10 km2
of
destroyed
ocean-
floor
The
company
has
switched
to solar-
powered
energy
Without reducing
the quality in the
end-product, the
company only
uses recycled
materials in
fodder-
production
The company has
committed itself
to invest 20% of
all earnings in
technology that
will help protect
wild salmon and
trout
Mean 13,43 17,22 13,25 22,78
Median 12,5 15 14,5 22,5
TABLE 2 | Evaluation of negative claims.
Claim The
companys’
activities
has
destroyed
10 km2
of
ocean-
floor
The
company
emits
over
100
metric
tons of
CO2
each
year
The company is
unwilling to invest
in new facilities. As
a consequence,
many of the farmed
fish escape,
increasing the
spread of lice, and
harming the wild
salmon in nearby
areas
The farming
activities cause
the emission of
nutrient salts and
organic matter,
which increase
the algae-growth
and
eutrophication in
the inner fjords
Mean 16,37 12,66 17,23 18,17
Median 20 10 15 20
TABLE 3 | Diluting claims.
Claim The company has
switched to slightly
costlier but more
eco-friendly
lightbulbs in all
offices
The company has
replaced all its cars
with electric cars
The entire
company
car-fleet consists
of high-emission
SUV’s
Mean 2,44 4,28 2,77
Median 0,5 1 0
pre-test could not participate in the experiment. Participation was
incentivized by lottery of smartphone and serving of pizza. The
experiment was done in an auditorium, and subjects used their
smartphone, tablet, or pc/mac to read instructions and indicate
responses. Web-based experiment-software ensured an even and
random distribution of subjects to either positive or negative
persuasion. In the positive persuasion setting, participants were
exposed to the following vignette (translated by authors):
“Imagine that you are applying for your first job, and that corporate
environmental care is of great importance to you. You consider
applying at Marine Farming, a large ocean-farming company.
A friend of yours already works at the company. In order to
convince you that Marine Farming is environmentally friendly,
your friend presents the following claims:.”
To ensure validity, the vignette had a 30 s forced exposure
setting. The software further randomized these subjects into three
subgroups; Group A was exposed to two of the strong positive
claims, Group B to three strong positive claims, and Group C to
four strong positive claims. The claims were all drawn from the
pool of four positive claims presented in Table 1. The software
ensured that which claims, and the rank order of presentation
of claims, was randomized across subjects (except for Group C,
in which all four claims were used, and only the rank order of
presentation was randomized).
The other half of the sample was randomly allocated to the
negative persuasion setting. They were ﬁrstly presented with the
following vignette:
“Imagine that you are applying for your first job, and that corporate
environmental care is of great importance to you. You consider
applying at Marine Farming, a large ocean-farming company.
A friend of yours works at a competing company. In order to
convince you that Marine Farming is environmentally harmful,
your friend presents the following claims:.”
This vignette also had a 30 s forced exposure setting. The
software further randomized these subjects into three subgroups;
Group Dwas exposed to two of the strong negative claims, Group
E to three strong negative claims, and Group F to four strong
negative claims. The claims were all drawn from the pool of four
negative claims presented in Table 2. The software ensured that
which claims, and the rank order of presentation of claims, was
randomized across subjects (except for Group F, in which all
four claims were used, and only the rank order of presentation
was randomized). Both vignettes described a source (friend) who
spoke of the company in a manner that is congruent with her
motives, as we expect that subjects assume that the friend would
prefer that the target applies for a job at the same company as the
agent.
After having been exposed to both the vignette and the
claims, each participant indicated how much they liked the
company, how certain they felt about their liking of the company,
how believable the claims were perceived, and how relevant
they felt the claims were. The participants also gave scores
on persuasion knowledge and perceived informational intent
by indicating their level of agreement with the statements;
“I felt my friend was attempting to inﬂuence my choice of
employer,” and “I felt my friend wanted to give me information,”
respectively. All these outcome-measures were given on 7-point
likert-scales. Additionally, each subject completed the 11-item
Hong reactance-scale (see Hong and Page, 1989; Hong and
Faedda, 1996).
Results from Experiment 1
Manipulation checks revealed that positive and negative
persuasion lead to a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the perceived
likeability of the company, F(1,172) = 178,26, p < 0.001. There
were no overall-eﬀects of amount of claims used. Figure 1 shows
the level of liking of the company among groups who were
exposed to either two, three, or four positive claims, or two, three,
or four negative claims.
Hypothesis 1 states that there should be signiﬁcant diﬀerences
among the diﬀerent conditions within positive persuasion, not
an overall eﬀect of amount of claims. So in order to test
Hypothesis 1, we performed planned contrasts between each
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FIGURE 1 | Single item response of how much the subjects like the company, across experimental conditions.
of the groups in positive persuasion, and each of the groups
in negative persuasion, with level of liking the company as the
dependent variable. In positive persuasion, univariate analysis of
variance revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between two and four
claims, F(1,5) = 7,32, p = 0.009, as well as borderline signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between three and four claims, F(1,2)= 2,97, p= 0.09.
Surprisingly, there were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between two
and three positive claims. In negative persuasion, liking of
company increased marginally with each added negative claim.
However, when running the same planned contrasts between
diﬀerent amounts of negative claims, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
levels of liking the company were found. Based on these ﬁndings,
we partially conﬁrm Hypothesis 1. It seems that presenting two
positive claims “leaves room” formore persuasion, if more claims
are added. In negative persuasion, however, a satiety-like ﬁnding
emerges, in which the level of liking is not aﬀected by the presence
or absence of more than two claims.
Previous studies have indicated that behavioral outcomes are
seldom predicted by the valence of an attitude alone, but rather
by the valence combined with certainty or attitude-strength
(Tormala and Petty, 2004). In order to increase our ability
to make predictions of behavioral outcomes, subjects in our
experiments were asked not only to indicate how much they
liked the company, based on the information they had received,
but also how certain they felt about that feeling. In order to
include both valence and certainty in our analysis, we computed
a variable that captures the likeability of the company, multiplied
by the certainty-score the subjects gave. Manipulation check of
certainty-adjusted liking showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
positive and negative persuasion F(1,3312) = 59,64, p < 0.001.
There was also a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of the amount of claims
F(2,273) = 4,93, p = 0.008. Planned contrasts between the
diﬀerent subgroups revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between two
and four claims in positive persuasion, F(1,350)= 4,82, p= 0.032.
Similar diﬀerences were found between three and four positive
claims, F(1,367) = 6,03, p = 0.017. No diﬀerences were found
amongst the groups in negative persuasion. This ﬁnding further
supports Hypothesis 1.
Using persuasion knowledge as outcome-variable,
manipulation checks again revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between positive and negative persuasion F(1,20) = 13,35,
p < 0.001. The number of claims also carried a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect F(2,5) = 3,69, p = 0.027. Figure 2 shows the level of
persuasion knowledge among groups who were exposed to either
two, three or four positive claims, or two, three or four negative
claims.
An interesting ﬁrst observation from the analysis is that
persuasion-knowledge in negative persuasion is much higher
than in positive persuasion. This ﬁnding is addressed in larger
detail in the discussion part of the article. In order to test
Hypothesis 2, we performed planned contrasts between the
diﬀerent groups. The results revealed signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in the amount of persuasion knowledge elicited by two and
three positive claims F(1,9) = 5,71, p = 0.020. Going from
two to four positive claims also induced a signiﬁcant shift in
the amount of persuasion knowledge elicited F(1,9) = 4,44,
p= 0.039. There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between three and
four claims. When performing the same planned contrasts for
diﬀerent amounts of negative claims, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
were found. Performing the same analyses with skepticism as
outcome variable, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant asymmetry between
positive and negative persuasion, in that negative persuasion
elicits more skepticism in general F(1,42) = 26,31, p < 0.001.
Figure 3 displays the mean rating of credibility or believability
across groups.
The stark asymmetry in credibility between positive and
negative persuasion is also elaborated on in the discussion.
Moving on to the planned contrast, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
variance in skepticism with regards to diﬀerent numbers of
claims, in positive or negative persuasion. We further tested
whether or not the reported ﬁndings could be due to variance
in the strength of claims, rather than the numerosity of claims.
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FIGURE 2 | Single item response of persuasion knowledge, across experimental conditions.
FIGURE 3 | Single item response of credibility-perception, across experimental conditions.
We computed variables consisting of the sum of strength of
claims, based on the pre-test mean and median evaluation of the
strength of the claims (see Table 1). These variables were used in
standard multiple regression models. All the reported signiﬁcant
ﬁndings remained, even when controlling for the strength of
claims, while none of the reported insigniﬁcant ﬁndings were
explained by strength of claims. Hypothesis 2 thus stand as
partially conﬁrmed.
Experiment 2: Dilution Effects
The purpose of the second experiment was to explore the
role of diﬀerent quality or subjective strength of claims in
positive and negative persuasion. Eighty-six students from a large
Norwegian business-school was recruited to the experiment.
Participation-incentives and practical procedure were identical
to Experiment 1. Web-based experiment-software ensured that
the participants were randomly distributed to either positive or
negative persuasion, in which two of the claims were randomly
collected from the list of four claims used in Experiment 1, and
one of the claims came from the list of diluting claims presented
in Table 3. Two diﬀerent diluters of positive persuasion were
used, and one diluter of negative persuasion. The negative diluter
used was that the company car-ﬂeet consisted of only high-
emission SUV’s. This claim was selected because results from
the pre-test indicated that it best ﬁtted the purpose of being a
moderately diluting claim. The two positive diluters were chosen
on diﬀerent grounds; the “lightbulb”-claim was chosen because
the results from the pre-test indicated that it received a score
almost identical to the negative diluter. The “electric cars” claim
was chosen because it represents a semantic comparable contrast
to the negative diluter. The vignettes and instructions given to the
subjects were otherwise identical to Experiment 1.
After exposure to both the vignette and the claims, consisting
of one diluting claim and two strong claims, each participant
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 September 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1324
Nordmo and Selart Positive and negative persuasion
indicated their responses on the same outcome-variables as in
Experiment 1. Here as well, each subject completed the Hong
reactance-scale (see Hong and Page, 1989; Hong and Faedda,
1996).
Results from Experiment 2
Preliminary analysis of the results from Experiment 2 revealed no
diﬀerences between the two positive diluting claim conditions.
To ensure statistical power and symmetry, these groups were
combined to a joint diluted positive persuasion group (N = 44).
All further analysis in this experiment was done with this
combined group. No diﬀerent results were obtained when
keeping these groups separate.
To test for dilution-eﬀect, we performed independent samples
t-tests, where the three strong claims groups were run against
their corresponding diluted groups. According to the theoretical
predictions, dilution eﬀects were expected to manifest in the
positive persuasion domain, but not in the negative domain.
However, the ﬁndings from the t-tests showed that across all
outcome variables, in both positive and negative persuasion, no
dilution eﬀects were present. This suggests that the presence
of a claim with low quality or low subjective strength, in
conjunction with two strong claims, has scarce eﬀect on the
total persuasion. This ﬁnding is similar to the one obtained
by De Vries et al. (2014), where only completely irrelevant
information produced dilution-eﬀects, and moderately diluting
information produced no dilution-eﬀect. Hypothesis 3 is thus
rejected.
Diluted claims were expected to bring about an increased
sense of being subject to a persuasion-attempt, as the total pitch
would come across as more heavy-handed. This eﬀect was not
manifest in our results, as we found no diﬀerence in persuasion
knowledge or skepticism between the groups who were exposed
to three strong claims compared to the groups exposed to
diluted sets of claims. However, both theory and past research
on resistance to persuasion suggests that dispositional reactance
should give a person a heightened awareness of being subject to
a persuasion-attempt. Hypothesis 4 is based on this assertion.
In order to test Hypothesis 4, we conducted moderator analyses
(see Hayes, 2013), using dilution as independent variable,
persuasion-knowledge as outcome variable, and dispositional
reactance as moderator-variable. Figure 4 presents the model
described.
The results revealed no interaction when using positive claims.
This indicated that diﬀerent levels of reactance had little or
no eﬀect on the amount of persuasion knowledge elicited by
including a diluted claim. In negative persuasion, however, a
signiﬁcant interaction was revealed. The eﬀect of dilution of
claims, on persuasion knowledge, is dependent upon another
predictor, dispositional reactance. Table 4 shows the values of the
model.
Plotting the graphs for level of persuasion knowledge,
conditional on dispositional level of reactance, and dilution
of claims, it is clear that high-reactance subjects exposed to
diluted negative claims showed higher persuasion knowledge,
while low-reactance individuals did not. Figure 5 displays the
interaction
FIGURE 4 | Moderation model.
TABLE 4 | Interaction values.
Coefficient SE t p LLCI ULCI
Constant 13,06 3,80 3,44 0,0011 5,46 20,66
Reactance –2,04 1,19 –1,72 0,0903 –4,43 0,3313
Dilution –1,12 0,46 –2,43 0,0179 –2,04 –0,20
Int 0,33 0,15 2,27 0,0264 0,04 0,62
Discussion
Direct Effects
Our most powerful ﬁnding is the large diﬀerence in the amount
of persuasion-knowledge and skepticism generated by negative
claims, relative to positive claims. Our theorizing from the point
of evolutionary psychology and consumers past experience with
similar persuasion episodes is contradicted by this ﬁnding. This
is theoretically interesting, as past research on the eﬀects of
negative persuasion is limited. We interpret the ﬁnding in the
light of negativity eﬀect, stating that negative events are given
more attention, and weighted more heavily than positive claims.
As negative claims receive more attention and elaboration,
they also induce an elevated amount of scrutiny in the targets
interpretation of the claims. The target who gives more attention
and performs a deeper elaboration of the claims is more likely
to make attributional inferences into the motivation of the
agent, resulting in an increase in their awareness that they
are being subjected to a persuasion-attempt. Put diﬀerently,
they increase their persuasion knowledge. The heightened level
of scrutiny also induces a higher level of skepticism, making
the target perceive the claims as less believable. The high
levels of persuasion knowledge and skepticism revealed in the
negative persuasion groups correspond well with the limited
eﬀect negative persuasion had on overall likeability of the
company. The positive persuasion induced a mean liking that
was higher than the one for negative persuasion. Given that the
neutral point on this outcome variable is four, the results clearly
indicate that the impact on likeability generated by positive
persuasion was far greater than that of negative persuasion. The
reason for this diﬀerence seems to lie in the increased coping
in negative persuasion relative to positive persuasion. However,
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FIGURE 5 | Interaction.
the limitations of the current study leaves room for alternative,
or supplemental interpretations. In the current study, the target
was presented as “considering applying at Marine Farming.” This
may be perceived as stating that the target already held a positive
view of the company, and a behavioral intention that leaned
more toward applying than not applying. Subjects may have
interpreted the vignettes as saying that the positive persuasion
agent tried to enhance or aﬃrm a behavioral intention that
was present to begin with, while the negative persuasion agent
tried to stop and alter a behavioral intention. As such, it may
be the case that arguing against the application is perceived as
a more invasive or heavy-handed action than arguing for it.
However, as both vignettes described the target as “considering
applying,” another interpretation may be that the target already
has a slightly negative view of the company, hence the need for
consideration. In line with this interpretation, negative claims
would be conceived of as more aﬃrming of an attitude that
is already present, while positive claims are perceived as a
more invasive attempt at attitude-change. We therefore disregard
this potential interpretation. Another confounding element in
the present study may be that the person arguing for the
company is currently working there, while the person arguing
against the company works at a competing ﬁrm. The diﬀerent
positions of the sources may be considered a confounding
variable, which might explain the heightened skepticism and
persuasion knowledge among the subjects exposed to negative
persuasion. The vignettes were designed in this way to secure
a sense of motivation on behalf of the source in both the
negative and positive persuasion setting. Future experiments
should attempt to remove this confounding variable, while
maintaining realism in the congruency of source and motivation.
The present study described a typical scenario for positive and
negative persuasion, in which a representative of a company
speaks well of her employer, or ill of a competing company. We
consider the opposite scenario, in which someone speaks well of
the competition, and ill of one’s own company, as less realistic.
Indeed, De Vries et al. (2014), attempted to use claims that were
incongruent with the motives the organization in question is
assumed to act upon (an industrial organization that spoke well
of CO2 capture and storage). They found that this breach of
realism in the design of stimuli made the subjects confused, to
the extent that their responses failed to pass the manipulation
check. In our experiment, the source of the message is positioned
in a way that allows for congruency between her motivations
and the content of her claims. On this basis, we can conclude
that positive claims made from someone within a company
generates far less skepticism and persuasion knowledge than
negative claims made from someone at a competing company.
Although we are unable to pinpoint whether this eﬀect stems
primarily from negativity bias or the relative position of the
source of the claims, the ﬁnding is nevertheless theoretically and
pragmatically interesting, as it arose from a realistic description
of events.
Our secondary sets of ﬁndings show that the eﬀects of diﬀerent
amounts of claims in persuasion are asymmetrical across the
positive–negative divide. This ﬁnding resonates well with the
theoretical predictions from negativity eﬀect and numerosity
eﬀect. More speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that the amount of
claims induce quite small variances in outcomes overall, but the
signiﬁcant changes are all within positive persuasion. This ﬁnding
also corresponds well to the predictions made by past work
on positive–negative asymmetry. We assert that receiving more
and more information about how environmentally responsible
or irresponsible a company is, will aﬀect ones perception of
the company, up to a certain point. Past this point, more
information of the same valence will no longer produce changes
in the impression of the company. We refer to this theoretical
inﬂection point as a satiety point, as there is no longer any
eﬀect of additional information of the same valence. The
ﬁnding that more information elicits changes in the eﬀect of
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positive persuasion, but not in negative persuasion, is interpreted
in the light of this satiety-model of persuasion. Our ﬁnding
demonstrates that the psychological level of satiety is reached
sooner in negative persuasion than in positive persuasion. The
reason for this is that negative claims are weighted more heavily,
given more attention, and elaborated on more thoroughly, than
positive claims. Consequently, less information is needed before
the point of satiety is reached. This ﬁnding resonates well with
prospect-theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), in that the slope
on the graph is steeper in the area of negative information
(losses) than in the area of positive information (gains). It
also corresponds well with the notion of contagion, put forth
by Rozin and Royzman (2001), in that perceived virtue stems
from many, consistently positive behaviors, while a single act
of immorality elicits immediate contagion, and further acts of
immorality are superﬂuous in changing the impression for the
worse. Here as well, it is possible to argue that the position
of the source plays a confounding role in the interpretation
of the claims. However, even though the claims presented in
negative persuasion are perceived as less believable than the
ones presented in positive persuasion, they are still perceived
as more believable than neutral (mean believability rating >4).
Another possible confounding aspect to our design is the fact that
the claims used are semantically diﬀerent, and were evaluated
diﬀerently in the pre-test. However, the variance in strength
within the four positive and four negative claims is very similar.
The diﬀerence in median score from the weakest to most
powerful claim is 10 points, in both sets of claims. And as
the list of two, three, or four claims were randomly generated
for each research-subject, we believe that it is unlikely, but
not impossible, that the results could be caused by diﬀerences
in the strength of the claims. Within positive persuasion, our
ﬁndings show support for the numerosity eﬀect (see Pelham
et al., 1994). Our ﬁndings contradict the “charm of three”
ﬁnding, demonstrated by Shu and Carlson (2014), in which three
claims consistently generated more liking and less persuasion
knowledge than four or two claims. Instead, we ﬁnd that four
claims signiﬁcantly outperforms two and three claims, even
though persuasion knowledge is increased. One of the diﬀerences
between our design and that of Shu and Carlson may be
that we assess persuasion in a CSR setting, rather than in a
traditional marketing setting. The claims we therefore use are
more speciﬁc in nature than the claims used by Shu and Carlson
(2014).
Interaction Effects
Finally, we demonstrate that including moderately diluting
claims in bundles of claims give no direct eﬀect on the outcomes
of persuasion. This ﬁnding is consistent with previous research on
moderately diluting claims (Tetlock and Boettger, 1989; De Vries
et al., 2014). The implication of this ﬁnding is that the subjective
quality of the claims used in CSR communication has less eﬀect
on the outcome than one would intuitively imagine.We interpret
this ﬁnding as being fairly consistent with the phenomenon
of scope insensitivity or scope neglect (see Desvousges et al.,
1992). This eﬀect states that, in lieu of available reference-points,
diﬀerent levels of positive and negative impact on the wellbeing
of people and ecosystems are unconducive to persuasion. This
eﬀect has been studied experimentally in philanthropy and
environmentalism. For instance, when asked how much they
would be willing to pay to save 2000, 20,000, or 200,000migratory
birds from uncovered oilponds, the respondents average answers
were 80, 78, and 88$, respectively. Similar experiments showed
that residents would pay little more to clean up all polluted lakes
in Ontario than polluted lakes in a particular region of Ontario
(Kahneman, 2004). Furthermore, residents of four western US
states would pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness
areas in those states than to protect a single area (McFadden
and Leonard, 1993). One proposed explanation for scope neglect
is the “valuation by prototype”-hypothesis, suggesting that the
mental representation of the diﬀerent options usually consists of
single, representative and emotionally charged exemplars (such
as a single bird drenched in oil), rather than numerical variables
(Kahneman et al., 2000). The results from our experiment are
compatible with scope neglect, as the subjects responses indicate
that the attitude toward the company is unaﬀected by the scope
of the claims, and more aﬀected by the prototypical direction
those claims point (good/bad). Only when adding dispositional
reactance as another predictor variable were we able to identify
a signiﬁcant eﬀect of dilution. Based on available theory, it is
easy to understand why the level of dispositional reactance is
associated with the amount of persuasion knowledge elicited
by diluted claims. However, it is diﬃcult to interpret, based on
available theory, why this phenomenon is asymmetrical across
the positive–negative divide, and only manifest within negative
persuasion. Hence, we report it here as a singular ﬁnding, and
leave the interpretation for future research.
Contribution, Implication, and Future Research
The present study is one of the few studies to investigate
persuasion in both positive and negative directions. Recently,
Rozin and Royzman (2001) found that negative information
was more powerful than parallel positive information. Based
on this and other ﬁndings, loss-framed appeals have been
launched as more persuasive than gain-framed appeals (e.g.,
Johnson et al., 2005). However, negative frames have proven
to be more persuasive than positive ones predominantly when
participants’ processing of the information is in-depth (Block and
Keller, 1995). The impact of negative message framing is thus
dependent on degree of elaboration, it seems (Jones et al., 2003).
Nevertheless, negative framing not only requires deep processing
in order to have a greater impact than positive framing, it also
stimulates more eﬀortful and thorough information processing
in itself (Kuvaas and Selart, 2004).
The present study adds to this literature by assessing in
particular how persuasion knowledge and skepticism are elicited
by positive vs negative persuasion. Ourmain ﬁnding, thatmorally
motivated positive framing of one’s employers’ green activities
generates far less skepticism and persuasion knowledge than
negative framing of competing ﬁrms harmful activities, is of both
theoretical and managerial value. The value of the ﬁnding comes
largely from the fact that the design of the study is realistic and
motivationally congruent. From a managerial point of view, the
results of this study imply that word-of-mouth accusations on
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behalf of a competitor are largely inadvisable, as they not only
face the risk of being condemned as inappropriate, but that the
entire persuasion-attempt risks coming across as heavy-handed
or transparent, as well as less believable. Highlighting one’s own
laudable eﬀorts seems to be a better persuasion tactic. From a
theoretical point of view, our results indicate that there seems
to be a positive–negative asymmetry in persuasion, not only
concerning the consequences of the persuasion per se, but also
the consequences using diﬀerent numbers of claims. This deepens
our understanding of the interaction between the numerosity
eﬀect and the negativity bias. However, as with most persuasion-
experiments, we cannot assert with certainty that these results
can be generalized to any persuasion setting. We recommend
that future research should attempt to isolate the mechanisms
behind the positive–negative asymmetry documented here, while
maintaining ecological realism and congruency in the design of
stimuli.
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